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LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CHILEAN HOUSING PROGRAM*
T. ROBERT BURKE**

PART II
LAW-RELATED ISSUES IN THE HOUSING PROGRAM
Having covered the nature and history of the housing problem and
the pertinent major institutions, we can proceed to discuss specific examples
of the role of law in the development process, as demonstrated by law-related aspects of major issues in the housing program. Certainly the major
issues in the housing program are not primarily legal issues. It is equally
certain that the legal problems and legal solutions discussed below are
not strictly legal; they are social, political, economic, etc. The following
sections illustrate how the law plays a substantial role in the development
process.
(a)

Land Use Control

Land use control laws are crucial to urban development, of which
housing is such an important part. The difficulties surrounding this body
of law illustrate an interesting and difficult problem. If land development
is not regulated, urban growth will be haphazard, wasteful, and substandard. And to prevent this, the Chilean Congress has legislated extensive
regulations. However, if regulations are excessive or outdated, they may
serve to impede, rather than assist, urban development. There is some
evidence of this counter-productivity in the Chilean experience. This section will discuss the problem of land development regulations as a constraint or obstacle to housing construction.
The major source of land use control and building regulations is
DFL 224 of 1953 as amended by Decree No. 880 of 1963 of the Ministry
*Part I of this article appeared in the June, 1970 issue
o/ the Americas.
**J. D., Stanford and Fellow of the International Legal
1968) in Chile; presently Staff Attorney of the National
Development Law Project of the University of California at
in the practice of law in San Francisco.
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of Public Works. The body of law composed of these two provisions plus
their modifications is called the Construction and Urbanization Law.
The Construction and -Urbanization Law legislates on building per.
mits, subdivision of land, land development requirements, building regulations, architects and building contractors, urban boundaries, and urban
general plans. In order to build a housing project one must have plans
drawn up by a licensed architect, receive permission from the government,
install roads, water, sewage, and electricity, and build according to prescribed standards. These regulations may not seem unduly harsh at first
glance, especially in view of the problems created by ad hoc urban sprawl.
Nevertheless, the time and money required to satisfy these requirements
as they stand, have resulted in their either discouraging housing construction or provoking low-income groups to build illegally.
The two major complaints against the Construction and Urbanization
Law are that (1) it requires land development that is disproportionately
expensive for low-cost housing projects, and (2) that the red tape involved in complying with the law is unnecessarily long and complex.
With regard to the first complaint, it is argued that there should be
a distinction made between the kind of development required for housing
in the wealthy districts and that required for low-income housing. Article
115 of the Construction and Urbanization Law requires that the developer
provide, at his own expense, for water, light, pavement, sewage facilities
and landscaping standards, for these services are found in the specific
regulations based on the Urbanization and Construction Law. The law and
the regulation were written at a time when the major concern was the
aesthetic character of a particular development. No thought was given
to the more pressing needs for shelter, regardless of aesthetics, of the lowincome sector. And no distinction was made between the requirements
for an expensive and a low-cost house, nor between a wealthy barrio and
a worker community.
The government is aware of the fact that the extensive and costly
development requirements of the Construction and Urbanization Law discourages construction of low-income housing. However, rather than change
the law, the government periodically passes low-income housing legislation which carves out exceptions to it. This was done in 1959 through
DFL 2, when Decree No. 1,464 of 1960 of the Ministry of Public Works
established the special regulation for low-cost housing built in conformity
with DFL 2. By Article 31 of this special regulation the public utilities
enterprises were ordered to dictate special minimal requirement for the
community services to be provided for the low-cost houses. Other exemp-
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tions are carved out in the recent Loteos Brujos Law which provides that,
the services of an architect are not required, permits may be granted to

build according to a standard plan, construction can proceed without all
the community services being installed, and for lower tax rates.
This erratic practice of carving exemptions onto the general land-use
law raises several questions. It would be simpler to change this law itself
to provide flexible development requirements depending on the price level
and the location of the housing being built. Because the exemptions are
scattered throughout the volumes of housing legislation, it is difficult to
be sure which requirements apply to a particular project at a given point
in time. Finally, the exemptions apply only to limited types of low-income
housing and thus leave many cases at the mercy of the admittedly inadequate provisions of the general land-use law.
A new Urbanization and Construction Law is now being drafted by
the Housing Ministry. It is unlikely that it will make any substantial
changes in the quality of development required for low-income housing
projects. The one possible exemption it may make is a waiver of the
requirement to provide paving. However, though the new law will not
make significant changes in the quality of development required, it will
make important modifications in the timing of the developer's work.
According to the new law, a builder will be permitted to construct and
sell housing after only minimal development; the additional development
can then be completed subsequently, but within a stated period of time.
Postponing the development requirements in this manner may make it
possible for more low-income families to move out of their present slum
environments.
The
tion Law
housing.
struction

other major complaint against the Construction and Urbanizais the amount and complexity of the red tape involved in building
This red tape is a particular burden to low-cost housing conwhere smaller sums of money are involved.

In an article attacking the stifling bureaucracy surrounding housing
construction, the leading architecture magazine in Chile lists more than
one hundred separate operations required in the course of building a
simple house. The article proceeds to assert in no uncertain terms that
the time and money lost in this tedious paper shuffling is a serious deterrent to developers.
Besides being numerous, the requirements of the law are often hopelessly confusing. Many of the sections on land development requirements
have baffled builders and enforcement agencies to such an extent that they
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have chosen to disregard the law. As for its organization, the "law" is in
fact a collection of laws constantly modifying and adding to the original
law. To find the applicable provision at any given moment is extremely
difficult. The Housing Ministry attempted to solve the problem in 1966
by publishing the laws on land development and construction in one
volume. Within a few months the Ministry itself proposed legislation
which was passed making its compendium incomplete.
A certain amount of paperwork and bureaucratic confusion is inevitable in any housing program. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence
that the situation in Chile is excessive, and that more streamlined procedures would make a substantial contribution to the success of the program.
The effects of the land development requirements of the Construction
and Urbanization Law on Chilean housing construction provide an interesting example of the role of law in this program. Laws designed to
regulate private activity must be reviewed periodically to insure that they
fulfill the purposes of the program and that they suit the existing situation.
(b) Urban land tenure
Chile recently found itself confronted with over 80,000 families
living or building on lots to which they did not have clear title. Most
of the people had agreed to buy the land from the owner, and had paid
a substantial amount of money. In a good number of the cases they
had moved on the land, and either had completed a house or were working on it. They lacked clear title to the land because of legal technicalities, ignorance, fraud, or other reasons. Disputes arose and these
led to a crisis. The following material will discuss the way the problem
arose and the measures taken to solve it.
As explained previously the Construction and Urbanization Law
does not permit developers to open new subdivisions without expensive
improvements to the land. It has been estimated that in the case of low
cost housing these improvements cost approximately five times as much
as the property benefitted. Even if they can afford this high land
development cost, low-income groups cannot afford the final product.
Therefore, the situation in Chile is one of desperate need for land
coupled with inability to pay for land which was developed in accordance with the law. So the law was broken in a variety of ways, thus
creating a crisis known as the Loteos Brujos, or land development
fiascos.

LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CHILEAN HOUSING PROGRAM

In many cases the buyer and seller proceeded in open disregard
of the Construction and Urbanization Law. The owner of the land was
probably not a wealthy man nor a professional developer. He owned
some property and he agreed to divide it and sell it. This practice went
on for a year without the interference of municipal authorities who
looked the other way because of their awareness that compliance with
the law would defeat the desperate need for land. In some cases the
owner intended to develop the land, but had not yet completed the work.
In other cases the owner intended to develop the land, but had run out
of money.
The most outstanding situations in the Loteos Brujos debacle
resulted from land swindles. These swindles were executed in a variety
of ways. A developer might have land for 300 building sites, 11 by 25
meters. He would divide up the land, place an advertisement in the paper
and sell the parcels to pobladores. The catch was that the purchaser
could not move on to the land until he had paid 70% of the purchase
price. The price was usually paid in monthly installments over about
a three year period. When the developer had sold all 300 lots, he would
return to lot :1 and sell it again. Since neither purchaser moved on the
lot for some time, neither knew of the other.
All went well until buyers began to reach the point at which they
had paid 70% and could occupy the land. Purchaser 1-A moved onto
his lot. Purchaser 1-B immediately smelled a rat and ran to the developer.
Purchaser 2-A had not yet paid his 70%, so the developer would tell
l-B that there had been some mistake and that he should move to lot 2
(all the lots are flat and virtually indistinguishable, so he got away with
it). Lots were sometimes sold three and four times. With so many sales
and constant shifting around, there were sometimes as many as ten
buyers who thought they owned one lot. A developer could play this
game for a surprisingly long time, but eventually the situation would
come to a head. By then, the developer was likely to be on the plane
for Buenos Aires.
Another common swindle consisted of a developer getting an option
to buy a section of land, displaying the option as proof of ownership
to ignorant buyers and "selling" them the land. He took the same plane
to Buenos Aires.
In all the above situations, whether characterized by mere disregard
of the law or swindles, the result was essentially the same. Disputes arose
over ownership of the land and needy families stood to lose either
substantial sums of money, or their land, or both. Ownership could not
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be clearly established because of the extreme confusion over land titles.
Victims of swindles did not have title because the seller did not own
the land, or, if he did own it, he sold it to several families. Those who
turned their back on the Construction and Urbanization Law did not
have title because they could not register their titles without calling
attention to their failure to develop the land as required. In Chile, title
registration is required to prove ownership.
To make matters worse, the law provided no remedy for the wouldbe purchasers. Since they had taken part in illegal transactions--land
sales not complying with development requirements-the law would
not come to their aid. Something had to be done to assist the 80,000
families embroiled in the Loteos Brujos. Law No. 16,742, known as the
Loteos Brujos Law was passed in February of 1968.
The Loteos Brujos Law authorizes the Housing Ministry to declare
a poblacidn to be in "irregular circumstances" when it is the site of a
serious Loteos Brujos problem. The property involved is then taken
over by the Housing Services Corporation (CORHABIT) in a kind of
receivership. CORHABIT then initiates a proceeding to determine who is
responsible for the Loteos Brujos. The owner of the land and the developer, if different persons, are held responsible to pay the costs of
completion. If they cannot pay these costs, their property can be taken
and liquidated to meet the expenses. CORHABIT then completes the
necessary development work.
Meanwhile, CORHABIT receives the claims of all those who claim
to have been affected by the Loteos Brutjos. These claims are judged,
and those who are declared to be the rightful owners are granted title
to their property. Those who have a valid claim to relief but do not
get the land are indemnified as much as possible from the property of
the responsible parties. Those who receive title are required to pay

the rest of their purchase payments to CORHABIT.
If CORHABIT finds it more convenient, it can condemn the entire
area, and then distribute the property as it sees fit. This may be
necessary where the claims to ownership are hopelessly confused, contradictory, and overlapping. If there is not enough money extracted
from the owner and developer to pay the developments costs, those who
are given title may be charged for the development, or they may undertake the development themselves through self-help projects.*
The significance of this law cannot be appreciated by taking its
provisions at face value. By itself, the law is an important and interest-
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ing piece of legislation. But more importantly, when considered within
the context of Chilean law and development, it is a radical departure
from the accepted law of property designed to salvage a large segment
of the marginal population from the harsh workings of the established
law. The Civil Code provides that land can be sold only by written,
notarized contract. The Loteos Brujos Law recognizes any evidence,
including testimony concerning oral agreements, in order to decide who
is the rightful owner. The Civil Code states that in order to acquire
tide to land, a purchaser must register his purchase within the Real
Property Rights. The Loteos Brujos Law says that registration is not
necessary to prove ownership.
Now that the Loteos Brujos Law has been promulgated to solve
this land problem, the major obstacle is implementation of the law.
One of the greatest difficulties may be the need to find competent personnel. CORHABIT has assigned a group of lawyers to the task of
assisting the victims of the Loteos Brujos, but this is a small group
facing large and difficult tasks. Their predicament is typical of any
development context. It is not enough that the government pass wellintended legislation. Lawyers must be sent out to help marginal groups
exercise their rights and remedies under the law.
The success or failure of the Loteos Brujos Law will be an interesting and important lesson. Land tenure problems are common to the
urban (and rural) development of almost all countries. Chile may have
found a way to solve these problems by its willingness to mold the law
to fit the situation--a healthy attitude for any country.
This case presents an interesting example of the way in which law
can help to both create and solve a development problem. The problem
arose in part because of laws providing unrealistic land development
requirements and a subsequent law had to be passed to solve the problem
created by the prior law. If the new law is not effective, the process
of correcting the correction could go on indefinitely.
(c)

Landlord-Tenant: Rent and Eviction

The rights and duties of landlord and tenants vis-a-vis one another
are always an important housing consideration. In the United States the
most notable example of landlord-tenant problems is the institution of the
"slum landlord." Fortunately, this has not been a serious problem in
Chile.
A landlord-tenant problem receiving current attention in Chile con-
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cerns the rights of rent and eviction. The changing law on this subject
has had sigificant and interesting effects on the housing market. The following material will discuss the way in which this problem has developed.
A large percentage of Chilean families live in rented housing. The
problem to be discussed in this section concerns primarily the middleincome sector since the low-income sector normally rents on an informal
and extra-legal basis. Nevertheless, middle income renting problems are
important to the low-income sector because the success or failure of the
middle-income groups in finding shelter has a direct effect on the price and
quantity of housing available for the low-income group.
The Civil Code, promulgated in 1855, provides that landlords are free
to charge whatever rent they desire and can evict month-to-month tenants
with one month notice. Article 1918 of the Civil Code says that the rental
should be set in the same manner as with a sales contract. Article 1808
in sales contracts provides that the sales price can be freely set by the
contracting parties. Eviction is treated in Article 1976 which states that
notice of eviction should be given one rental period in advance.
These Civil Code provisions are consistent with the free enterprise
notions current in the 19th century. The law guaranteed the owners right
to rent his property as he saw fit, thus giving considerable power to landlords in relation to prospective tenants. This power became particularly
significant around the 1930's as housing scarcity became pronounced.
Landlords had tenants at their mercy, and often abused their power by
charging exorbitant rents or evicting tenants summarily.
In order to remedy this situation, Law No. 6,844 of 1941 was passed.
This law turned the tables on the landlord by placing a ceiling of 7% of
assessed value on annual rent. This limit was raised to 11% by Law No.
11,622 of 1954 which is the current renting law.
Article 12 of Law No. 11,622 provides that three months notice must
be given before eviction instead of the one month required by the Civil
Code. One more month's notice is required for each year the tenant has
lived in the rented premises.
To make matters more secure for the tenant, Article 14 of the same
law requires that eviction be for "plausible motives." The article goes on
to provide that the landlord must give proof that the "necessity, utility,
or convenience of the eviction" justify the injury suffered by the tenant
in being evicted. The law implies that this proof cannot be taken lightly
and says that the motives will be presumed justified only when the landlord
or his family wish to occupy the premises. Because the tenant has this
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defense at his disposal, it is a well known fact in Chile that a tenant can
delay his eviction by at least a year if he wishes to use all of the stalling
tactics available in the court proceedings.
The current Renting Law is favorable to tenants. Unfortunately, it
has discouraged investors. One consequence is that many landlords evade
the law by charging illegally high rents. This could be fought, but tenants
desperate for housing normally do not fight it. A more common result
of present tenant-biased Renting Law is that investors have ceased to build
much-needed rental housing.
To correct this situation, DFL 2 of 1959 provided that those who
build rental housing meeting certain requirements would be exempt from
the rent and eviction restrictions of the Renting Law and would be sub.
ject only to the Civil Code. The qualified rental housing applied to units
under 140 sq. meters. The landlords are regulated only by the Civil
Code so that they can charge any rent they like, and may give only one
month's notice of eviction to a month-to.month tenant.
Tenants of DFL 2 housing are once again at a disadvantage, and are
mounting considerable opposition to the change in the law. Meanwhile
landlords are not satisfied either. They are still subject to the Renting
Law, No. 11,622, in all rental other than DFL 2 viviendas econ6micas.
The landlords argue that all rental housing should be freed from the
Renting Law, or that the Renting Law should be improved. The eleven
percent limit on rents is the biggest source of criticism. Landlords claim
that rents should be established according to some scale other than flat
percentage of the assessed value; or, that the flat percentage should be
raised.
Thus the controversy continues in an attempt to strike a balance between the investor's need for an adequate return so that he will continue
to invest, while insuring that the tenant is not overcharged.
The Chilean law on rent and eviction proceeded from the laissez faire
Civil Code to the protection of the economically deprived in the Renting
Law. Then, since the government and economy still rely heavily on private
enterprise, the law swings back to the Civil Code in order to attract the
private investor once again. This back-and-forth modification of landlordtenant law provides an interesting example of the difficulties involved in
rationalizing adverse interests, and the counter-productive consequences
which may result from tampering with the market in a market economy.
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(d)

Construction: Promotion of the Private Sector

The need to increase housing construction is one of the central problems of the housing program. Infinite approaches to the problem are
possible. Some countries have attacked the problem by establishing government construction enterprises; others by providing subsidies to low
income groups. Chile has relied primarily on a policy of providing incentives to attract private capital to invest in low cost housing.
The major incentives consist of tax exemptions for builders and owners
of low-cost housing. DFL 2 of 1959, discussed previously, is the major
tax incentive provision aimed at promoting low-cost housing construction.
The, most important exemptions in DFL 2 can be placed in two categories: exemptions for homeowners and exemptions for builders. The
exemptions apply to owners and builders of "low-cost housing" (viviendas
econ6micas) as defined in Title I of DFL 2.
According to DFL 2, homeowners are exempt from the tax on rental
income earned from their low cost houses. There may be actual rental income if the house is being rented or presumed rental income, which is also
taxable in Chile when the owner occupies his own home. Real property
taxes are suspended for a period depending on the size of the home; 20
years if under 70m2, 15 years if under 100m2, and 10 years if under
14Om2 . No inheritance tax is paid on the value of low-cost houses, and
no sales tax is paid on the first transfer.
Builders enjoy three important exemptions. Corporate income tax
is exempt if the corporation is devoted exclusively to the construction of
DFL 2 viviendas econtmicas. No sales tax is paid on construction materials used in such projects. And the five percent housing tax on the
net income of business and industry is exempted.
In addition, there are several minor tax exemptions and other benefits, all designed as incentives to the construction of low cost housing.
The following material- will discuss several consequences of the DFL 2
incentives, and ways in which some of these consequences have been or
might be remedied.
One of the results of the DFL 2 incentives has been the construction
of luxury or middle-income housing rather than low-cost housing. This
perversion of the original intention of the incentives is made possible by
the loose manner in which viviendas econ6micas qualifying for tax exemptions are defined. Article I of DFL 2 states merely that a vivienda
econ6mica must be smaller than 140m2 . It refers to the Special Regulation
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on Viviendas Econ6micas for further specification. This regulation states
minimum standards that must be met, but not maximum standards that
are permitted. Consequently, it has been possible to obtain generous tax
exemptions intended to promote low-cost housing by building expensive
houses with less than 140m 2 of floor space. Possible means of restricting
costly construction have either not been used or. have not been used
effectively. One technique would be to prohibit the use of expensive building materials or methods. Such a measure would require exhaustive listing
and might result in a blanket condemnation of materials and methods which
are justified in special circumstances. Chile has placed some restrictions
on permissible materials, but architects are unanimous that the restrictions
do not prevent luxurious construction.
A better method to limit tax-exempt construction to authentic lowcost housing would be to place a limit on the permissible cost, based on
the cost per square meter, or some other measure. Such a provision may
seem obvious at first glance, but the number of vested interests which
have grown up around DFL 2 exemptions have effectively blocked any
threatened move in this direction.
Another result of the housing tax incentives has been the construction
of DFL 2 housing in the wealthy barrios rather than in the workers' districts. Of course, this problem is closely related to the problem of highcost construction discussed previously. The original law provided the
President with the power to declare certain areas as off limits for the
benefits of this low cost housing construction program, but nothing was
done between 1959 and 1966.
The obvious solution to this problem would be to prohibit construction of DFL 2 housing in areas where it is not appropriate. This has
now been done in some instances, but it has been done tardily and poorly.
The beach resort Vifia del Mar was declared unqualified for DFL 2
housing in 1966, but by then the beach was lined with high-rise luxury
apartments benefitting from the exemptions. Vifia has recently been reinstated because efforts are now under way to do something for the notso-fortunate working class families who live in shacks back against the
hills rather than in the summer homes on the beach. Downtown Santiago
was declared off limits for DFL 2 housing also. But word got out that the
prohibition was coming and builders got their construction permits before
the ban was enacted.
Case by case approval or denial of DFL 2 housing projects could
probably control the location of these projects better than clumsy attempts
to designate entire areas as being acceptable or not. However, neither the
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willingness nor the administrative machinery to make these decisions is
now available.
A third consequence of the DFL 2 tax incentives is-that the private
investors at whom they are directed are making larger profits and receiving greater tax advantages than would probably be necessary to attract
them to the low-cost housing field. It is extremely difficult to know how
much incentive is enough incentive. It is also difficult to know accurately
what percentage of the profits come from low-cost housing since much
of the DFL 2 construction is actually aimed at the middle or upper income
market. Nevertheless, assuming it to be true that excessive benefits are
being realized from the incentives, we can proceed to discuss some possible
means of remedying this problem.
If the problem is one of excessive exemptions, an obvious remedy is
to limit the exemptions. Chile has taken its first major, though inadequate
step toward doing this in Law No. 16,742 of 1968. Article 76 of that law
amends Article 9 of DFL 2 so that contractors are no longer exempt from
the 5% housing tax on business and industry. It also amends Article 16
of DFL 2 so that the inheritance tax exemption no longer applies to housing acquired within six months of the decedent's death. Finally, it amends
or repeals several exemptions to minor taxes on official documents, requisitions and transfers.
These charges are important insofar as they go, but they
major exemptions untouched. The income, real property, and
exemptions continue. In view of the relative importance of the
and the surviving exemptions, it seems almost imperative to
that no substantial change has been made.

leave the
sales tax
modified
conclude

A final result of the DFL 2 tax exemptions is that they have distorted,
if not destroyed, the entire Chilean tax structure. The exemptions apply
to such a large portion of so many taxes involving so much revenue that
the entire fiscal structure has been shaken to its roots. Every important
Chilean tax is affected: .the income tax, the real property tax, the inheritance tax, the sales tax, and' the business and industry tax. Only one of
the exemptions is even limited as to term of years, and it extends from
ten to twenty years depending on the size of the house. It has been
estimated that Chile lost between 140 and 170 million escudos in tax
revenue in 1967 as a result of DFL 2 exemptions. A house worth 25,000
escudos may be exempted from 15,000 escudos in taxes over a twenty
year period. Certainly in light of these considerations, Chilean planners
are forced to ask themselves whether the benefits accruing are worth the
costs involved.
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One of the solutions to this problem was discussed above in relation
to the problem of incentives being excessive, i.e., limit the exemptions.
However, this approach will not recover the revenue being lost on DFL 2
housing which is already completed and enjoying the exemptions. Getting
around these exemptions is a difficult, perhaps impossible, problem.
One method of collecting revenue from these tax-exempt houses would
be to eliminate the exemptions. This probably can not be done without
resorting to condemnation, and, therefore, indemnification which would
defeat the purpose. In Chilean jurisprudence, a tax exemption becomes
vested as a property right under certain conditions giving rise to what is
called a contrato4ey (roughly a contract based on a statute). Without
delving into this confusing technicality, suffice it to say that it is virtually
certain that the DFL 2 exemptions are based on a contrato-ley, though this
has not been tested in the courts. Therefore, the government is barred
from merely terminating the exemptions.
Another possible way of taxing the tax-exempt houses would be to
impose a new tax, from which they are not exempt. This has been done
in the Chilean patrimonial, or wealth, tax. Under this tax, DFL 2 housing is included in the tax base in which the 8% patrimonial tax is levied.
Unfortunately, this is only a partial and temporary solution. The patrimonial tax is supposed to be in effect only through 1968 and the revenue
it produces does not make up for that which is lost through the exemptions.
Finally, no one is sure that this method of taxing DFL 2 housing is legal,
since it has not yet been challenged.
The problem related to DFL 2 demonstrates some of the difficulties
involved in attempting to establish incentives for the promotion of a
given desirable activity. Chile was seeking low-cost housing in poor areas
and has received high-cost housing in wealthy areas. How can a country
define incentives properly, and how can it supervise their questions?
What side effects may result from introducing incentives, and how can
they be remedied if they appear?
(e)

Taxation: Taxes Relating to Real Property

Taxes on real property are important to housing because of their
effect on the cost of land, and on the attractiveness of land as an
investment. Real property is a popular investment in Chile because its
value adjusts automatically to inflation. Because it is a good investment,
demand drives its price upwards. As a result, the acquisition of land
for housing, whether by purchase or condemnation, becomes more expensive.
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High taxes on real property would make land a less attractive in.
vestment and would force owners to put their property to more productive
uses. Low taxes on real property merely add to the attractiveness of real
property as an investment, and allow speculators to hold land out of use
until demand rises to a point where they can reap large profits. The following material will discuss the effect on real property of (1) the income
tax, (2) the inheritance tax, and, (3) the real property tax.
Law No. 15,021 of 1962 provides for a real property tax of 2% of
assessed value on all real property and property attached to real property,
thus including housing. To begin with, 2% is quite a low rate by comparison to most developed countries.
To make matters worse, the two percent rate is figured on assessed
value which is below market value. To correct this valuation problem an
assessment was carried out between 1962 and 1964. As a result, urban
property assessments were raised to approximately market value. The
increase over the former assessment was over 500%! This improvement
was only temporary, however, because the assessments are now revised
annually by the government's announced rise in the cost of living index.
This figure is below the true magnitude of inflation, so that land assessments are once again falling behind the true market value.
As discussed previously, DFL 2 of 1959 exempted certain low-cost
housing (viviendas econ6micas) from the real property tax for 10 to 20
years. This measure was designed to help solve the low-cost housing problem, but it may have the adverse effect of increasing land costs by decreasing tax burdens.
Income from real property is generally taxed at the rate of 20%.
However, real property taxes which have been paid are credited against
the 20% tax imposed on income from real estate. Consequently, the obligation to pay income tax on income from real property is usually eliminated.
Income from DFL 2 viviendas econ6micas is also exempt from taxation. Thus DFL 2 decreases the tax burden and increases the attractiveness
of real property in one more way.
Inheritance taxes in Chile are so low that few estates are subject to
any substantial tax. Nevertheless, the DFL 2 exemption of viviendas
econmicas has affected estate planning. A Harvard Tax Group study
refers to "the tendency for persons of wealth to increase their holding in
DFL 2 housing which passes to heirs free of tax."
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The experience of DFL 2 would seem to affirm the hypothesis that
lowering real property taxes will increase investment in the real property
on which the taxes are lowered. More investment in low-cost housing is
needed. If DFL 2 were in fact limited to true low-cost housing, rather
than high-cost housing as previously explained, its measures would be
fortified. With regard to high-cost housing and vacant land, the taxes
should be raised to discourage investors and to lower prices in order to
make land acquisition cheaper for middle and low income families.

Though it is not clear what effect the tax structure has on real
property in all cases, it seems quite certain that the effect can be substan.
tial. Therefore, planners would be well advised to proceed with particular
caution whenever tampering with the tax structure.
In the foregoing material taxation has been discussed in terms of its
effect on the real property market. Brief mention should be made of taxation as a revenue source to assist in financing the housing program.
Business income in Chile is subject to an additional tax in favor of
the Housing Ministry for use in the low-cost housing program. The tax
amounts to 5% of net income as calculated for income tax purposes. The
taxpayer may either pay the tax directly into the treasure as is done with
the regular income tax, or he may invest an equivalent amount directly in
the construction of low-cost housing. Acceptable direct investments include:
workers' housing built or paid for by the taxpayer, deposits of money in
savings and loan associations specializing in low-cost housing, loans granted
by an enterprise to personnel for the construction or purchase of low-cost
housing, and contributions made to companies engaged exclusively in lowcost construction.
Most businessmen have chosen one of the acceptable housing investments in preference to payment of the tax. A controversy has arisen over
one of these tax alternatives: the contribution to companies engaged exclusively in low-cost housing construction.
.The 5% tax was originally described as a. "contribution" to lowcost housing rather than as a "tax", probably to make it more acceptable
to taxpayers. Because it was a contribution, alternatives to direct payment
as a tax were permitted. One of these alternatives was contribution to a
low-cost housing enterprise. As a result several very large low-cost housing
companies, called "5% companies (Sociedades de 5%) were formed. These
companies have been successful and have constructed a substantial number
of DFL 2 viviendas econmicas. With the passage of time, however, it has
become clear that the 5% tax is in fact a tax and not a contribution.
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Those meeting the obligation by investing in 5% companies are making
money on the return on their investment; that is, they are making money
on the "tax" they are paying. There are many Chileans who feel that these
5% companies should be dissolved, or at least cut off from the 5% tax.
This may be done eventually, but it will be difficult since millions of
escudos have been invested in the companies relying on the 5% tax law,
and because the companies are now a major segment of the low-cost
housing construction industry.
The 5% housing tax has been an effective means of channeling more
escudos into low-cost housing. However, it is unfortunate that more
thought was not given to the way in which these funds should be used.
Tax considerations seem to enter inevitably into a development program,
and it is obvious that attention to tax policy offers substantial benefits to
development planners.
(f)

Land Acquisition; The Condemnation Power

The importance of land acquisition to the housing program is indisputable. To begin with, it is a truism that the government cannot provide
housing without the land on which to build. The cost of land is an
important factor in the housing program, and demands a substantial
portion of the funds dedicated to housing. Location of land is another
important factor: too often overlooked in the effort to minimize cost.
Housing planners must acquire land with an eye to its nearness to
work places, the socio-economic makeup of the community being created,
and the cost of providing community services for the land. Finally, land
must be used economically, as defined by the national planning goals.
Vacant land in the center of urban areas may be a wasteful land use
which the government will wish to remedy by acquiring the property and
building housing on it.
The government normally acquires land in one of two ways: by
purchase or by condemnation. Government purchases do not differ significandy from private purchases and for that reason presents no particularly
interesting legal problems insofar as this study is concerned. Therefore,
the material which follows will be limited to a discussion of land acquisition by condemnation.
Acquisition of land by purchase is normally an adequate technique
as long as the government is not determined to acquire a particular piece
of land which the owner is not willing to sell. However, in the course of
its efforts to place housing in strategic locations and to put vacant or
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minimally-used land to better use, the government is likely to confront
owners who are unwilling to sell. In these cases, and they should be
plentiful in a dynamic and well-planned housing program, condemnation
becomes an essential tool.
Until recently, condemnation has not been used extensively for land
acquisition in the Chilean housing program, due in large part to the
inadequacies of the law on condemnation. The three major obstades have
been (1) limited grounds on which condemnation could be based, (2)
long and complicated procedures, and (3) high costs.
The law on condemnation finds its basis in Article 10, Section
10 of the Constitution. Law No. 16,615 was passed in 1967 to amend
this provision in order to facilitate condemnation. Though the law
was intended primarily to assist in the land reform program, it has
considerable potential importance for housing as well. We shall look
briefly to the changes wrought by this amendment in an effort to
overcome the three obstacles to condemnation listed above.
The more liberal purposes for which property may be condemned
are reflected in the change of language in Article 10, Section 10 of
the Constitution. Article 10 begins, "The constitution guarantees to all
inhabitants of the Republic," and then goes on to list a kind of Bill of
Rights. Section 10 of the article, before the recent amendment read:
The inviolability of all property, without distinction. No
one may be deprived of his property . . . unless by a judicial
decision or by condemnation for reasons oj public utility
established by a statute.
The new section 10 reads:
The right of property in its varying aspects. No one may
be deprived of his property except by virtue of a general or
specific law which authorizes the condemnation in the interest
of public utility or social interest, as established by the
Legislature.
The earlier provision reflects a strict bias towards the rights of
private property. The inviolability of property is still one of the key
slogans of the conservative faction in Chile. But the recent amendment
speaks of the "right of property in its varying aspects." This language,
which we assume is purposely obscure, evidences an important trend
in Chilean legal and political thinking towards a much more liberal
attitude concerning property rights.
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The present concept of property might be described as a belief
in defining property in terms of its social function. The individual's
property rights are protected, but not if they conflict with the interests
of society at large.
Lawyers are aware of the danger involved in placing too much
weight on fine semantic distinctions. However, these changes in language
are of considerable importance in Chile. It must be remembered that
in a Civil Law jurisdiction such as Chile, the language of the legal
provision is accorded substantially more importance than in our system.
Judicial interpretations of the provision are not as important as they
are in the United States. In Chile, scholars will accord great significance
to the words used, and government officials charged with executing
condemnation matters will be influenced by the changes made.
There is already evidence of the influence of the more liberal
approach found in the amendment. The statutes permitting the government bodies to condemn property for the housing program are being
interpreted and applied broadly. Thus, the decree establishing the power
of the Urban Improvement Corporation provides for condemnation in
those cases which "the institution deems necessary for the creation of
programs for housing, community facilities, and urban development in
general . . . " The Urban Improvement Corporation is currently condemning property for each and all of these purposes, and in many
cases is then turning it over to third parties, both public and private.
Condemnation for such broad purposes was rare, ifnot unknown, before
the constitutional amendment.
The procedure for condemnation is a major factor in its effectiveness. In keeping with the formal bias in favor of protecting private
rights against public interference, prior condemnation procedures were
long and complicated. Dilatory procedures were plentiful. The government had a difficult burden of proof against a large battery of defenses,
and the land could not be taken until the entire proceeding was final.
The present Article 10, Section 10 of the Constitution provides
only generally for the condemnation procedure. It states,
The law will determine the norms for providing indemnification, the proper court to hear claims as to the amount of
indemnification. . . . the form by which this obligation is to be
extinguished, and the means by which the condemning body
will take possession of the condemned property.
Thus, the government was able to establish the condemnation
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procedures. The law by which the procedure was subsequently established deserves special attention. To enact a new condemnation procedure
by statute would have meant facing all the difficulties of going through
the legislature; not the least of which would be opposition from parties
of the Left and the Right. Rather than submit to this ordeal, the
Administration devised a clever subterfuge. Rather than propose new
legislation, the President issued a decree revising condemnation procedures
in a 1935 statute. In this way the government was able to establish
precisely the procedures it wanted with virtually no opposition.
The decree provides two methods of condemnation. By the first
method, called "condemnation with agreement to value," the property
owner and the government settle on an indemnification amount. The government takes possession of and title to the property, and the owner
is paid 20% of the indemnification immediately with the remainder paid

in two annual payments.
The second method, called "condemnation without agreement as to
value," is the more important case of our purposes, and requires a
more involved procedure. After the condemnation decree by the govern.
ment, if the government and the owner cannot agree on the indemnification, the government designates three experts selected from a special
list to set the value. When the value is determined, the government
deposits 20% with the court and takes immediate title and possession
of the property. The value determination can be appealed, but the
condemnation is final. The remaining eighty percent of the indemnification, whether set by the experts or the court, is paid in five annual
installments.
The major advantage of this condemnation scheme, from a procedural
point of view, is that the government can take the condemned property
immediately, rather than have to wait for a final determination as to
the government's right to condemn, or the value of the indemnification,
as was true with the former procedure.
The new provision also bestows substantial economic advanges on
the government. Article 10, Section 10 before 1967 provided:
In such a case (condemnation), indemnification must be
paid to the owner before the condemnation will be considered

final.
As stated above, the present section 10 leaves the procedure to be
established by a later law, which the President has done by decree. The
present section 10 merely says:
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The condemned owner will always have the right to
indemnification; the amount and conditions of payment of which
shall be determinted justly, taking into consideration the
interests of society and the condemned owner.
As explained above, the controlling decree on condemnation provides
that the governemnt now takes the property after having paid only 20%
of the value, rather than the entire amount. The balance is paid in
two years where there is agreement as to the value, and over five
years where the value is contested. Six percent annual interest is paid
on the unpaid balance; and 60% of the unpaid balance is increased by
that year's percentage increase in wages and salaries, or consumer's
prices, whichever is lower.
This method of payment is considerably cheaper for the government than the former payment procedure; and, therefore, makes possible
increased exercise of the condemnation power. Because of the obligation
to pay only 20% of the value in order to take the property, the government can condemn more property in a given year.
The other terms of payment-number of years, interest, and readjustment for wage or price increases-are extremely important in view
of Chile's inflationary economy. Thus a condemned owner is prompted
to come to agreement as to indemnification in order to be paid off in
two rather than five years. Six percent interest on the unpaid balance
is a benefit to the government and a burden to the owner in view of an
inflation rate in the area of 20%. Finally, the government is bound to
make an adjustment on only 60% of unpaid amount. To add insult to
injury, these inflation figures are set by the government and fall short
of the actual inflation.
There is one more advantage to condemnation which, now that
condemnation is procedurely and economically feasible, contributes to its
attractiveness. Purchase of land requires long and difficult searches
to provide against the possibility of clouds on the title. Condemnation,
on the other hand, results automatically in a free and clear title for
the government. For this reason, the Chilean government is now using
condemnation in some situations where purchase would be no more
expensive.
Condemnations which before the 1967 amendment to the Constitution
accounted for a small percentage of the land acquired in the Chilean
housing program, now accounts for well over half of the land acquired.
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As a result of the amendment, more land is acquired, more effectively
and more economically.

(g) Financing
1. Provision of Credit for Homebuyers
The Chilean financial problem has already been discussed. It consists primarily of two factors. First, incomes are low and housing costs
are high. Second, the Chilean economy is too inflationary to permit
normal saving and lending practices. It follows that one of the major
causes of the housing shortage in Chile is the lack of financing.
The government has adopted a number of measures to attempt to
overcome the housing finance problem. It has bolstered the private
sector by establishing and supporting a private savings and loan system;
and by providing tax incentives to builders and owners of DFL 2 low.
cost housing.
The public sector has contributed to the solution of the housing
finance problem through the social security organizations, by way of
grants and loans, through public works, and by administering and sup.
porting a public savings and loan system. Efforts to improve this
latter program, the public savings and loan system, will be discussed
in the following material.
Until recently, the government savings and loan system has been
hopelessly confused and economically unsatisfactory. Over twelve different savings plans were available, at least in theory. Terms, interest
rates, and down payments varied arbitrarily. Though savings was to be
a major condition for obtaining a loan, the granting of the loans was
not in fact closely related to an aspirant's savings record. Loans did
not constitute an effective response to the demand for housing. Finally,
the loans were not adequately tailored to meet the costs of the
borrowers.
To remedy these and other weaknesses in the public savings and
loan system, the government has ordered a re-structuring of the program.
This new system is set out in Decree 553 of September 26, 1967, and
is known as the Popular Savings Plan. (Plan de Ahorro Popular).
The Popular Savings Plan offers five different savings plans leading
to loans for the purchase of five different kinds of housing assistance.
Plan No. 1 consists of two stages--the first stage being an undeveloped
lot, and the second stage being development of that lot. Plan No. 2
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allows direct purchase of a developed lot without the need to pass
through a first stage as in Plan I. The third plan provides a loan to
purchase a "basic unit" which is a house twenty meters square with
bathroom and kitchen. Plan 4 calls for a "family unit;" a forty
square meter house. Finally, Plan 5 makes available a "remodeled";
a forty square meter apartment near the center of the city.
The plans are listed in order of the magnitude of the savings
required and the loan obtained under each plan. An applicant signs
up for the plan he wishes to pursue by inscribing his name in the
Applicant's Register of the particular plan. Each plan has a list
of savings requirement which must be met to receive a loan.
Let us assume that a worker in Santiago wishes to obtain a loan
to purchase a "family unit". In order to inscribe in the Register for
the plan, Plan 4, he must deposit the required "initial savings" of
142 savings quotas. He must then continue to deposit 12 savings quotas
each month (12 quotas being the "monthly quota") for the next
24 months (24 months being the "term of the plan"). At this rate,
he will at the end of twenty-four months arrive at the "necessary
savings" of 430 quotas, with which he is entitled to receive his
loan. The loan for Plan 4 in Santiago is 2,400 savings quotas. The
borrower has fifteen years in which to pay off the loan, at a rate
of 15.7 savings quotas per month. Each plan is designed with requirements of this nature, differing only in terms of the amounts involved,
depending on the plan concerned and the area of the country in which
the loan is sought.
The savings and the loans are subject to monetary correction.
As the prospective borrower is accumulating savings, the savings he
is. credited with are increased periodically by the amount of inflation
during that period. Thus, if a man has savings of 100 and there is
an inflation of 5, he will be credited with savings of 105. The same
correction is made on debts, so that a man owing 100 when there
is an inflation of 5 is held to owe 105. In this way the savings and
the loans are supposed to maintain a constant value. The extent to
which this does or does not work is a subject which must be left to
an economist.
Accumulating the "necessary savings" does not guarantee immediate
receipt of a loan. The Popular Savings Plan provides that an aspirant
may apply his loan to the construction or purchase of any qualified
housing, whether it is part of a public or a private project. Therefore,
if one wishes to take his loan out onto the private market, he may.
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In fact, this is done very rarely because the housing available on the
private market will be considerably more expensive for an equivalent
size and quality. Instead, the borrower places his name on an Application List to wait for the opportunity to apply his loan to the purchase of a house in a publicly initiated project. His name is placed
on this list according to a point system, and housing is made available
to those with the most points, as explained in the next section. The
waiting period may extend into years depending on the Plan and the
zone involved.
The prospective borrower may withdraw from the program at any
time before receiving his loan, and may always withdraw any savings in
excess of the "initial savings," "monthly quotas," and "necessary savings." Once the loan is granted, he must maintain the "necessary savings," and the debt is guaranteed by a first mortgage on the property
he acquires with the loan.
The Popular Savings Plan went into effect in March of 1968, and
it is difficult to evaluate it at the time of the writing. Nevertheless,
it is possible to venture a few comments and criticisms regarding this
attempt to improve the public savings and loan system. Four purposes
along with their respective attendant problems will be discussed.
They are: (1) reform of the administrative structure to include fewer
savings plans, (2) improved coordination between private and public
savings, (3) better response by the savings and loan program to housing
demands, and (4) assurance that loans coincide with housing costs.
In order to reduce the confusion of the former savings and loan
program, the Popular Savings Plan decreases the number and variety of
plans to five. The idea is to channel all housing efforts through a
limited number of clearly defined programs, each one tailored to meet
the needs and capacities of a particular group. Another advantage is
that the new scheme is supposed to set the public savings and loan
system off from all other housing programs in a more definite way.
Finally, it allows the Housing Ministry to exercise more careful control
over the planning and execution of its housing activities.
A major difficulty of this new system is that however neat and
logical it may be on paper, it is not consistent with the actual state
of affairs of Chile's housing situation. The government cannot provide a few set packages of solutions if the problems are not equally as
neatly divided. The solutions must fit the problems, and the problems
are infinitely diverse and complex. A poor man who needs a roof will

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

not be helped by Plan 1 which provides an undeveloped lot; and yet he
cannot afford the new house offered by Plans 3, 4, or 5. As previously
discussed, housing needs must be viewed as a continuum of housing
services. The government program should provide alternatives along
the length and breadth of this continuum.
The present 5-plan system also fails to take into account the
requirements of unfinished work left over from prior programs. These
left-overs demands account for a large part of the housing program and
must be provided for. The result is that the closed system of the Popular
Savings Plan was opened to outside forces before it began. Efforts
to secure better administration control of the housing program are
laudable, but the effort must be made against a program allowing
for a plurality of housing programs.
Another purpose of the Popular Savings Plan is to relate public
investment to private savings. By tying the granting of loans to a borrower's
savings record, public savings are used to stimulate private savings. In
this way the system has a multiplier effect on the funds available for
housing, since the borrower must save an amount equal to approximately
15% of his loan in order to be able to unite his savings with public funds.
The government is in effect saying to the prospective buyer that if he will
demonstrate his willingness to contribute to the financing of his housing,
the government will join with him to make that financing possible.
The success of this approach depends in large part on maintaining a
proper balance between private and public effort. It is extremely difficult
to know what amount of private effort can be and should be required to
merit public support. Assuming that this balance can be struck satisfactorily, the system appears to have considerable merit.
A problem with this method, however, is the very fundamental
question as to whether and to what extent assistance should be based on
willingness and ability to save. Willingness is certainly the more acceptable
criteria, though it may penalize the family of a negligent head of the
household. Ability to save, on the other hand, may very well have no
relation to the needs of a particular family. Since the present Chilean
system is emphasizing ability to save, it may in effect be saying that the
less one has, the less he will receive.
The means by which the Popular Savings Plan attempts to assure
that loans are granted on the basis of savings records will be discussed
in the next section which deals with the point system according to which
loans are distributed.
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A third purpose of the Popular Saving Plan is to measure housing
demand in order to insure that the government program is providing
assistance where it is most wanted and needed. The way this is supposed
to work is extremely simple: if a certain number of families sign up for
one Plan, then the demand for the assistance provided by that Plan must
be equal to the number of families applying, and the government will
assist exactly that number of people rather than waste its efforts where
they are not "in demand."
Though this method may look ingenious at first glance, it does not
take a great deal of scrutiny to see that the "demand" which is measured
and met is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. We offer five programs and
by helping the applicants for these programs, we satisfy the housing
demand. Obviously this does not allow for the infinite kinds of demands
which cannot be met by the five plans. And it does not allow for the
families which choose one of the five plans but would seek other assistance
if it were available. Finally, it makes the rash assumption that demand
is reflected in the ability of families to save.
Even with the five current plans there is considerable doubt as to
their appropriateness to meet the demands of the various sub-markets they
attempt to cover. Eighty-two percent of all applicants are inscribed in
Plans 1 and 4. The response to Plan 3 has been so frigid that it will
probably be dropped altogether. We return to our previous conclusion
that housing programs must be sufficiently varied and flexible to deal with
all facets of the housing problem.
A final purpose of the Popular Savings Plan is the provision of loans
which will be sufficient to meet the costs of the type of housing for which
they are intended. Each savings plan is designed to provide a particular
kind of housing assistance, not just a certain size of housing loan. Thus,
completion of Plan 2 leads to a developed housing site and Plan 4 provides
a "family uniL"

In the private savings and loan system, a particular loan may be
intended to permit purchase of a stated type of housing, but if the loan
falls short the borrower has to make up the difference. In the public
savings and loan system, the government promises that the loan will
permit recognition of the assistance it is designed to attain. The loans were
originally planned so as to be adequate to their stated purposes. However,
costs have risen and the loans are not always sufficient. When this happens,
the government is having to make up the difference.
This problem must be solved for the system to be economically
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viable. Housing costs might be held constant by fixing prices. There is a
good deal of price setting in Chile, but it is not a happy choice to make.
Another solution would be to raise the requirements for the various plans
so that the loans would meet the higher costs. Finally, the government
might follow the private savings and loans system, and not guarantee that
the loans will be sufficient to acquire a stated objective.
The government savings and loan system is an appealing alternative
to costly give-away programs. Additional efforts must be made to administer it in a way that responds to the demands of the low-income sectors
while distributing the financial burden as effectively as possible.
2.

Distribution of Financial Assistance

Assistance should be distributed so as to reward desirable activity
yet attend to those most in need, and not frustrate reasonable expectations.
The Chilean housing program, having devised the Popular Savings Plan
to attract savings and grant loans, must develop an effective method of
determining the order in which loans will be provided.
Those who have accumulated enough savings to be eligible for a
loan from the Popular Savings Plan are placed on a list of loan applicants
in an order determined by the number of points they have. Points are
assigned according to the quantity of the applicant's savings, his being a
member of a community organization, his family size, and other factors.
As building sites or housing become available, loans are distributed to
those highest on the list. This section will discuss the point system.
The difficulty in designing such a point system is establishing a clear
and just priority, which at the same time tends to further the purposes of
the programs. This is done principally by assigning the most points to
those factors which are considered most important. Thus, if the aspirants
need is to be emphasized, a large number of points are assigned for each
family member. But if effort is to be rewarded, more points will be given
for a good savings record.
Before the Popular Savings Plan, the government savings and loan
system was plagued by long and unmanageable waiting lists, arbitrary
standards, and inefficient recognition of the savings effort made by some
aspirants. There were situations in which the lists were disregarded and
applicants were passed over while others received loans; and there were
long waiting periods for many prospective borrowers. These problems
and the ways the Popular Savings Plan attempts to meet them, will be
discussed in the following material.
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Long and unmanageable waiting were both a result of the sign-up
requirements. A housing aspirant needed only one savings quota to have
his name on the list. In the Popular Savings Plan, twenty quotas are
required to be admitted even to the first stage of Plan 1. In this way the
lists are limited to those who are willing and able to make a serious
savings effort.
Arbitrary standards for the granting of loans were a result of the
haphazard way in which over twelve different savings plans were operating side-by-side. This confusion has been eliminated by the establishment
of five clearly defined plans in which the assignment of points is carefully
set out.
The accumulation of savings was often overlooked under the former
system, because high points were assigned for marital status and size of
family. Under the former system a man received twenty points for being
married, ten points for each member of his family, and only five points
for every fifty savings quotas saved toward receiving a housing loan.
Through the Popular Savings Plan a man receives 1000 points for
accumulating the "necessary savings," 10% more for being a member of
a community housing organization, 15% more for being a member of a
housing cooperative, 20% more for joining a self-help housing project,
and only 3% more for each family member in excess of four. The change
in emphasis is remarkable. Whereas the system used to focus on need as
a criterion for assistance, it now uses the point system as an incentive to
savings and community action.
Another problem under the former system was the occasional passing
over of applicants on the lists in favor of families involved in other
programs. One cause of this phenomenon was the slum eradication program which relocated slum dwellers in new housing regardless of their
savings records. Other exceptions to the lists were made on occasion when
members of social security organizations, whose housing is normally
handled separately, would be given new housing which might have gone
to applicants on the lists. In both of these situations, the expectations of
the loan applicants are frustrated, and the public trust in the savings and
loan system is jeopardized. Unfortunately, these two exceptions to the
integrity of the list, the eradication program and the social security programs, have not been solved by the Popular Savings Plan as of yet.
Long waiting periods for prospective borrowers have been a continuing headache. The problem is particularly acute for the man who gets on
the list but cannot move up because of his inability to accumulate more
points through savings or other means. The former system assigned two
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additional points for each year an applicant was on the list. Though this
was not adequate, it was better than the current system which gives no
recognition to the age of an application. There should be some relief or
encouragement for the man who has acquired his savings and has been
waiting for months or years for a loan.
The point system of the public savings and loan system has been
improved considerably. The Popular Savings Plan has established a system
with greater clarity which is more adequately suited to the declared
purposes of the program. However, two particular criticisms must be made.
One criticism is that the present point system makes almost no
allowance for the need of the applicant. A housing program cannot be
run this way; and, in fact, the Chilean system does give consideration to
need. The way it does is by making exceptions in the point system or in
the case of slum eradication where the families are given housing regardless of savings. This gives rise to the second criticism: the public cannot
be convinced of the certainty and justice of a point system if exceptions
are made. If allowances must be made for factors other than savings and
community action, and such allowance is unavoidable, then these other
factors should be incorporated into the point system to preserve the
integrity of the system.
3.

Mortgage Loan Servicing

The Popular Savings Plan depends for its success on a revolving fund:
a loan is granted, the borrower pays back the loan, and the money he
pays back is used to make another loan. Therefore, the recuperation of
capital by way of collecting mortgage debts is essential to the system.
Conversely, a heavy default rate can bankrupt the Plan. There is at present
a serious problem of uncollected debts in the government savings and loan
system. Causes of this problem, and some possible means of solving it, will
be discussed in the following material.
It has been estimated that approximately 80% of the 150,000 borrowers are behind on at least one payment; the average is ten payments
behind. The revenue which is due and outstanding amounts to approximately 60 million escudos.
The effect of these defaults is serious. Not only will the Plan gradually
go bankrupt, but also while the Plan continues thousands of applicants
are being denied housing because their neighbors do not pay their debts.
Another consequence is that for those who have received their loans, the
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program has become a give-away program rather than a sound financial
arrangement.
Unlike the public savings and loan system, the private savings and
loan system has been able to maintain a very low default rate. This suggests that savings and loans systems are viable in Chile and that there

is room for improvement in the public program. The following weaknesses
in the system will be discussed briefly: (1) the administration of debt
servicing is highly inefficient, (2) a tradition of non-payment must be
overcome, (3) debt collection is often subordinated to wooing voters, and
(4) legal sanctions for non-payment are often inadequate when employed.
Administrative procedures are sorely inadequate for the servicing of
150,000 mortgage debts. Possibly the most extreme case is that of a community of 15,000 people who have yet to be billed after six years in their
new homes. The irony of this situation is that the people want to pay, but
the government has yet to figure out what they owe. Until they pay they
will not have clear title to their houses, they will not be able to get loans
to improve their houses, and they will not be able to get rid of certain
"unsavory" elements who have moved into their community.
Even when the government knows what a borrower owes, there is no
bill sent out to tell him what his debt is and when it is due. The borrower
is expected to come to the regional office on his own cognizance and
cancel his debt. At the office he joins a long line of borrowers who wait
while the clerk sorts manually through a veritable mountain of bills and
receipts, all of which are made out separately by adding machine, onefinger typing, and long-hand.
The long run solution to these administrative problems probably lies
in more streamlined methods. A computer was used recently as an experiment in one district of Santiago. On the first attempt, it raised debt
collecting by 40 to 50%.
The short run solution of this administrative morass must depend on
clearing up the huge backlog of debts in order to bring matters up to
date. It is probably unrealistic to expect borrowers who have been allowed
to fall ten payments behind to pay up. If they can only afford thirty
escudos per month, what are the chances they will be able to pay three
hundred escudos in back debts? The collecting agencies are now being
encouraged to accept whatever payment they can get from a borrower.
Rather than hound a borrower for an extra ten escudos, they are given
discretion to decide that the debtor has paid as much as can be expected,
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and they cancel his debt. Another technique is to waive whatever penalties
are owed for being in default. Finally, some collectors have executed new
payment contracts with the debtor on the spot. These contracts have no
legal validity, but are often persuasive to the debtors.
.Another problem of debt collection is the difficulty of overcoming the
tradition of non-payment; or the lack of a tradition of payment. Many of
the recipients of government housing assistance are recent arrivals from
rural areas where they were under the protective (though sometimes harsh)
wing of the patron who provided them with the services they now seek
from government. These services are expected as a matter of right and not
as something for which they should be charged. There is some basis for
this feeling towards the Chilean government, since in many cases the
working people have received assistance free of charge. Numerous earthquakes have required the government to supply free housing to the
disaster victims. This aid is said to come through the government housing
agency, CORVI. The saying, "Casa Corvi-casa gratis" grew up, and it
persists today. The non-payment tradition is fed by the fact that defaulting
purchases are not evicted under today's programs, as will be discussed
below.
The government's interest in collecting debts is often dulled by its
desire to attract working class voters. This is often due to the fact that
debt collection is supervised by a political apprentice who draws his power
from his ability-to marshall votes in his district, and not from his ability
to collect debts. A more glaring case of politics-before-economics is the
occasional decree that all the debtors in a particular area will be exempt
from the national readjustment raising debts in accordance with that year's
inflation. This is done not infrequently as a political favor and amounts
to a give-away of the difference between what would be owed with the
readjustment and without it. Politics also enters the mortgage loan servicing province when political figures refuse to enforce judicial eviction
orders, as will be discussed next.
One can hardly ask the government to forget politics and concentrate
on financial responsibility. Nevertheless, it must be hoped that the government will become fully aware of the fact that it is destroying its own
housing program by always opting for short-run voter satisfaction. If the
government wishes to subsidize housing, then it should create a well-planned
system of subsidies. But it should not distribute haphazardly de facto
subsidies by mismanaging a system which is economically viable in theory.
Legal sanctions for default have not been used extensively, and have
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often been ineffective where attempted. The case against a defaulting
purchaser is not difficult to make. A debtor is allowed to fall three payments in arrears. After three defaults an action should be commenced
against him. The government need only go to court and prove the default
to obtain an eviction order.
In practice the government has not brought many of these suits, as
demonstrated by the fact that the average defaulting debtor is ten payments
in arrears. Defaulting purchases are so numerous that the government does

not have enough personnel to bring all of the actions. Also, as mentioned
above, there is considerable reluctance to sue, for political reasons.
Nevertheless, a number of actions are brought. In these cases the
government has secured an eviction order with little difficulty. At this
point the remedies break down once more. The court does not have the
"poder pr~blico," the power to enforce its own judgments. It issues a

judgment which the successful party must take to the local political official
to be enforced. The political official is an appointee who got where he is by
being able to deliver votes to his party in his area. If he evicts a working

class family from its home on Tuesday, half the major papers will run a
damning expose of his cruel and heartless act on Wednesday. The political
official decides that a few mortgage installments are not worth risking his
party's (and his) political necks. Multiply this scenario hundreds of times,
and you have a savings and loan system that cannot enforce collection of
its loans.
There is no chance that the current defaulting purchasers can be
forced to pay. The government could not bring 120,000 suits even if it
wanted to. The brightest hope for improving the recuperation of capital
by collecting debts lies in improvement of the collection procedure in
order to avoid the need to employ sanctions. In future cases of default, it
is hoped that the government will sort out the most extreme cases for
legal action. It is unlikely that public opinion would line up behind, for
example, the man who has moved out of his home in order to collect rents
on it, but is not paying off his loan. Then it must be hoped that the
responsible political officials would enforce the eviction order.
The Popular Savings Plan is not a perfect system, as
previous sections. Nevertheless it does hold out hope for a
contribution to the solution of Chile's housing problems. It
fortunate if this program fails, not because it was ill-conceived,
it was improperly executed.
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SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF
LAW TO DEVELOPMENT
The Legal Process as a Development Environment
The immersion of the development process in the legal process is
unavoidable. Development plans and programs must inevitably confront,
change, work with, and create law.
The very powers and responsibilities of the government for develop.
ment are found in law: the Constitution. When the government began to
move cautiously into the housing field, one of its first acts was to pass laws
to regulate housing construction; the forerunners of the current Construction and Urbanization Law.
As shown in the section on the legal history of the housing program,
the government efforts in housing have produced a growing list of laws
and legal institutions. When the government began to take a direct role
in housing, organizations had to be created. Laws were passed to create
those housing institutions, and further laws were passed to regulate their
activities.
Many of the problems encountered in the housing effort had their
roots in, or were aggravated by, the law. Examples have been seen in the
laws passed to regulate construction, the rights of landlords and tenants,
and methods of land transfer.'
New approaches to the housing problem which have been attempted
over the years have found their expression as laws. Savings and loan
associations were created, community participation through cooperatives
and self-help housing schemes were promoted, and a housing tax was
imposed on businesses. These innovations have their basis in economic,
political, and social considerations, but to be effective they must be translated into law; and fitted into the overall legal structure. The success with
which these policy decisions were transformed into actual programs has
been critical to the success of the housing program.
It should be evident from the above that any development program,
such as housing, is inextricably intertwined with the legal process. The
legal process is an environment within which the development process
operates.
Legal Causes of Development Problems
Since most development programs are concerned with economic development, it is natural that most development problems have economic
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causes. Many other development problems find their causes in the social
and political systems. The legal process is inevitably involved in these
problems, but usually could not be listed as one of their causes. There are
situations, however, in which the legal process may be, if not the major
cause, at least one of the causes of a given development problem.
As previously discussed in connection with the substantive law of
urban land tenure, the strict requirements for recording land titles and
the unrealistic demands of the Construction and Urbanization Law led
to a situation adversely affecting thousands of low-cost housing aspirants.
If provision had been made for these people in the law, the problem need
not have arisen. Proof of this fact is seen in the passage of the law of
Loteos Brujos which is remedying the situation.
The Renting Law has created distortions in the housing market which
have worsened the short supply of housing units as already discussed. Because landlords are restricted in the rent they may charge, investors have
shied away from building rental housing. Recent housing laws have attempted to remedy this situation by exempting qualified housing from the
Renting Law. This re-creates the problems which led to passage of the
Renting Law in the first place. Therefore, study is under way to draft a
law which will satisfy both landlords and tenants.
The low tax on real property, made even lower by the under-assessments on which it is based, has driven property prices upward by making
real property an attractive investment, and has kept property off the
market by allowing speculators to hold it without heavy tax consequences.
A higher real property tax should lower land values, put more property
in circulation, and provide proceeds from a resource where much of
Chilean wealth is hidden.
The Legal Process as an Impediment to Development EJIorts
Though not a cause of development problems, as suggested in the last
section, the legal process may be an impediment to development efforts
insofar as there may be defects in the legal process: that is, ways in which
the legal process does not perform its functions effectively. If the legal
process is important to the development process, then defects in the legal
process may impede development efforts. For the sake of simplicity, I will
discuss the defects in the legal process in terms of defects of form, substance, procedure, and enforcement.
The notion of defects of form is meant to suggest the problem of
poorly written laws which by reason of their content or organization cannot
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be worked with effectively. The Construction and Urbanization Law.presents an excellent example. Many of the sections on building regulations
have baffled architects and enforcement agencies to such an extent that
they have chosen to disregard the law. As for its organization, the "law"
is in fact a collection of laws constantly modifying and adding to the
original laws. To find the applicable law at any given moment is extremely
difficult. The Housing Ministry attempted to solve this problem by publishing the laws on construction and urbanization in one volume. Within a
few months the Ministry itself sponsored legislation which made its compendium obsolete.
Substantive defects which impede development are readily apparent.
Perhaps the best example in the Chilean housing effort is a defect which
has now been cured: the constitutional provision on expropriation. Before
the Constitution was amended, the government was without an important
tool for acquisition of land for housing construction. The lack of an
effective expropriation power could not be called a cause of the housing
problem, but its unavailability was a serious impediment to the housing
program. Through the recent amendment, the government should be able
to acquire more and better land for less money, thus making the housing
effort more effective.
Procedural defects are found in those parts of the law which set out
the methods by which legal rights and duties are protected and performed.
These procedures may be concerned with legal actions in the courts of
law, or with the red tape required to perform legal transactions. One of
the major procedural difficulties facing the housing program is the
inability of the Housing Ministry to enforce its right to collect mortgage
payments. Though the courts will order eviction of a defaulting purchaser,
the responsible political functionary will not enforce the order for fear of
incurring the wrath of working class voters. If the power to enforce judgments were entrusted to the courts themselves, rather than to the elected
officials, this problem would not arise. A second important procedural
defect is the red tape for which all bureaucracies are infamous. Suffice it
to say that the number of stamps, notarial signatures, and carbon copies
necessary for a simple transaction is staggering.
The failure to enforce the law can be a serious defect in the legal
process. The legal obligation of mortgage debtors to pay for their houses
is not being enforced in many instances. One result of this will be an
additional financial burden on the housing program, with the result that
fewer houses will be built in the future. The Construction and Urbanization
Law was not enforced by municipal officials who felt that the law was
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unrealistic. The result was the Loteos Brujo which left thousands of people
in serious trouble and saddled the municipalities with responsibilities for
large inadequately developed housing projects.
Finally, mention should be made of the interrelationship of defects.
For law to work, it must be correct in form, well-conceived in substance,
provide effective procedures, and be enforced. A defect in. any one of
these areas will be reflected in the law as a whole.
Law as the Implementation of Development Programs
Development programs result from a long process of defining the
problem, gathering data, designing methods to be used, and setting goals.
Consideration is given to the political, economic, and social ramifications
of the problem and its solution. After this process has been completed and
a proposed program has been outlined, the program must be implemented.
One of the major steps in implementing a development program is putting
it into law-both drafting the legislation and executing it.
The Frei government decided that administrative reform of the housing
program was needed. Out of an infinite variety of possible reforms came
the system already described, with the Housing Ministry working as a
coordinator of a set of autonomous organizations. The structure of this
system was set out in Law No. 16,391 and has since been elaborated on
and modified by further laws and decrees. The successes and failures of
this administrative structure are due in part to the manner in which it
was drawn up and translated into law. If the regulations setting up
CORMU and CORVI were more tightly written so that the two organizations were not given overlapping powers, there might be less conflict and
duplication in their work. If the Office of Planning and Budgeting of the
Housing Ministry were assigned more authority over the executing institutions, there might be better coordination in the area of planning.
In 1960 housing authorities were looking for a way to encourage
savings for housing and to make mortgage loans available - a good trick
in a country plagued with chronic inflation. DFL 205 of 1960 set up the
savings and loan system as an attempt to answer this need. Savings and
mortgage payments would be readjusted annually to allow for inflation,
and savings and loan operations would be regulated and insured by a
government agency. When difficulties have arisen in the system in the
past years, new laws have been passed to cure the defects. Today the
savings and loan system is a major source of housing financing, and proof
that innovation within the institutional framework can have important
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consequences for development. Savings and loans may be called an economic rather than a legal device. Whatever their nature, the success of
the Chilean savings and loan system is due in large part to the ability of
those who drafted the implementing legislation.
Lawyers are found throughout the housing institutions involved in
the drafting and execution of housing laws. One of the major offices of the
Housing Ministry is the Office of Legal Affairs, and each autonomous
institution has a legal staff as one of its major components. Besides the
legal staffs, there are many more people with legal training who are working in planning and administrative positions. The constant need to work
with law, in housing or any other development program, makes these
individuals valuable to the implementation of the programs they are
engaged in.
Reform in the Legal Process as a Developmental Technique
A good deal has been written recently about law reform. For the
most part, "law reform" has meant the drafting of new substantive laws
and codes of procedure. Developing countries might well consider giving
increased attention to this kind of reform and more - reform of the entire
legal process. Efforts should be made to modernize the legal process in
order to make it a more effective agent in the development process.
Reform is the conscious 'correction of defects. Where a defect in the
legal process is working contrary to the development effort, reform of the
legal process becomes a development technique. To plug modern development programs into an inadequate legal process is fruitless.
Where is reform needed? Throughout the entire legal process: in law
making and the judiciary, in substantive and procedural law, in law enforcement, in legal education, and in the legal profession. Who is responsible for the reform? Everyone who works in the legal process: lawyers,
judges, lawmakers, enforcement agents, and scholars.
The methods of reform are many and varied. Reform may come
through statutes, decrees, or regulations. In a more gradual fashion, it may
come about by reinterpretation of old laws. Important reform of institutions
may be accomplished by restructuring their apparatus or restating their
goals. Scholarly research may point the way toward reform. And the force
of public opinion may provoke reforms in the old order, or demand reforms that will bring the law in line with former customs.
The criteria for reform are difficult to state because they are essen-
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tially the same as the criteria for development as a whole. Indeed, reform
and development are to a great extent synonymous. When we call for
reform in the legal process, we are really calling for development in the
legal process which will parallel and enhance development in the entire
social system.

